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METASTABLE CONVERGENCE AND LOGICAL COMPACTNESS
XAVIER CAICEDO, EDUARDO DUEN˜EZ, AND JOSE´ N. IOVINO
Abstract. The concept of metastable convergence was identified by Tao; it allows converting theorems
about convergence into stronger theorems about uniform convergence. The Uniform Metastability Principle
(UMP) states that if T is a theorem about convergence, then the fact that T is valid implies automatically
that its (stronger) uniform version is valid, provided that T can be stated in certain logical frameworks. In
this paper we identify precisely the logical frameworks L for which UMP holds. More precisely, we prove
that the UMP holds for L if and only if L is a compact logic. We also prove a topological version of
this equivalence. We conclude by proving new characterizations of logical compactness that yield additional
information about the UMP.
Introduction
The concept of metastable convergence was isolated by Tao. It played a crucial role in the proof of his
remarkable result on the convergence of ergodic averages for polynomial abelian group actions [Tao08], and
again in Walsh’s generalization of Tao’s theorem to polynomial nilpotent group actions [Wal12].
Metastability is a reformulation of the Cauchy property for sequences, i.e., a sequence in a metric space
is metastable if and only if it is Cauchy. However, for a collection of sequences, being uniformly metastable
is weaker than being uniformly Cauchy. In his 2008 paper [Tao08], Tao proved a metastable version of
the classical dominated convergence theorem that he then used to obtain uniform metastability rates of
convergence for ergodic averages.
Tao remarked in his paper that metastability is connected to ideas from mathematical logic. He noted,
thanking U. Kohlenbach for the observation, that metastability is an instance of Kreisel’s no-counterexample
interpretation [Kre51, Kre52], which is in turn a particular case of Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation [Go¨d58].
In fact, before Tao’s paper, the concept had been used under different nomenclature by Avigad, Gerhardy,
Kohlenbach, and Towsner in the context of proof mining. See [AGT10, KL04, Koh05, Koh08]. For a more
up-to-date survey on metastability rates obtained by proof mining, see Kohlenbach’s lecture at the 2018
International Congress of Mathematicians [Koh, pp. 68–69].
A connection between uniform metastable convergence and model-theoretic compactness was first exposed
by Avigad and Iovino by using ultraproducts [AI13]. After this, Duen˜ez and Iovino proved a metatheorem
called the Uniform Metastability Principle ([DnI17], Proposition 2.4), which roughly states the following:
If a classical statement about convergence in metric structures is refined to a statement about
metastable convergence with some uniform rate, and this latter refinement can be expressed
in the language of continuous first-order logic, then the validity of the original statement
implies the validity of its uniformly metastable version.
The operative word above is uniformly: The striking fact about the Uniform Metastability Principle
is that it allows one to convert a theorem about simple convergence into a stronger theorem about uni-
formly metastable convergence automatically, provided that in the statement of the theorem, one replaces
convergence by the mathematically equivalent notion of metastability. Thus, for instance, Tao’s uniformly
metastable dominated convergence theorem follows from the classical dominated convergence theorem as
a particular application of this metatheorem. Also, as Tao pointed out, his proposed abstract version of
Walsh’s ergodic theorem [Tao] follows from the original version [Wal12]. (Tao cited the aforementioned
Avigad-Iovino paper [Tao, AI13].)
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It is natural to ask if the UniformMetastability Principle holds with logics more expressive than continuous
first-order. The more expressive the logic, the more powerful the metatheorem. On the other hand, the proof
of the Uniform Metastability Principle uses the fact that continuous first-order logic is compact, and there
is a delicate balance between compactness of a logic and its expressive power.
In this paper we show that the Uniform Metastability Principle is in fact equivalent to compactness for
logics. More precisely, we prove the following theorem:
1. Theorem. Let L be a logic for metric structures. Then L is compact if and only if every theory of
convergence is a theory of uniformly metastable convergence.
Our main results, Theorems 3.14 and 3.15, establish a fine correspondence between the many forms of
compactness arising in logic (for theories or families of theories — see VI of the Preliminaries section) and
natural forms of the Uniform Metastability Principle (for sequences, for nets, etc.) Among the many forms of
compactness that are studied in logic, the strongest is compactness for arbitrary theories, while the weakest
is countable compactness for theories (i.e., any countable finitely satisfiable theory is satisfiable). At the full
compactness end, the correspondence with uniform metastable convergence takes the form quoted above; at
the countable compactness end, it takes the following form:
2. Theorem. Let L be a logic for metric structures. Then L is countably compact if and only if every
countable theory of convergence for sequences expressible in L is a theory of uniformly metastable conver-
gence.
These results provide mathematicians with a “black box” to convert theorems about convergence into
theorems about uniform (metastable) convergence: If a convergence theorem can be written in a logic that is
compact, then its uniform metastable version is automatically true; if not, then the automatic conversion is
impossible. A given theorem in analysis may not be expressible in first-order logic, which is a fully compact
logic, but the natural framework for the theorem may be a stronger logic that admits a weaker degree of
compactness, say, countable compactness.
We deal with metric structures, but even in the discrete case, i.e., for two-valued logics in discrete struc-
tures, the information given by these results appears to be new.
There are many examples of countably compact logics (typically, extensions of first-order by generalized
quantifiers — see Examples 1.28). Therefore, the forward implications of Theorem 1 give a vast generalization
of the Uniform Metastability Principle, and they extend the scope of this metatheorem to contexts where
proof-theoretic methods may be unavailable.
We obtain the forward implications from purely topological considerations (see Section 3-II, where we give
a topological version of the Uniform Metastability Principle). To prove the reverse implications, we extend
to the setting of metric structures a characterization of [κ, κ]-compactness originally proved by Makowsky
and Shelah [MS79], and we adapt it to characterize (κ, κ)-compactness.
In last section of the paper, we prove new characterizations of countable compactness for families of
theories, and from this we obtain additional information about the Uniform Metastability Principle. To
state the main result of this section, we need to recall some terminology from model theory: If L is a logic,
a structure is M is said to be RPC∆ in L if M can be characterized, up to isomorphism, by a theory in L ,
possibly with the aid of additional functions and relations. (See Definitions 4.1 and 4.2.)
We prove the following result:
3. Theorem (Proposition 4.5 and Theorem 4.8). If L is a logic for metric structures, then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(1) L is not countably compact for families of theories.
(2) The structure (ω,<) is RPC∆ in L .
(3) Any metric structure of cardinality less than the first measurable cardinal is RPC∆ in L .
The equivalence between (1) and (2) generalizes facts known for two-valued logics. However, the equiva-
lence between (1) and (3) gives us new insight on the concept of logical compactness. This equivalence shows
that logics that are not countably compact have great expressive power: In universes where measurable
cardinals do not exist, a non countably compact logic can characterize any metric structure.
This, together with the main result, gives us the following new dichotomy for logics:
Corollary. If L is a logic for metric structures, then one and only one of the following condition holds:
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(1) The Uniform Metastability Principle holds for sequences in L .
(2) The structure (ω,<) (equivalently, any structure of power less than the first measurable cardinal)
can be characterized by a theory in L , with the aid of additional functions and relations.
We use this dichotomy to prove that if L is a logic, κ is an infinite cardinal less than the first measurable
cardinal, and the UniformMetastability Principle holds in L for κ-sequences, then it holds in L for sequences
(see Theorem 4.11 and Remark 4.12).
We do not presuppose expertise in mathematical logic from the reader. However, we assume familiarity
with the concept of structure, as is defined in any model theory textbook, and the concepts of language or
vocabulary of a structure.
The authors are grateful to Clovis Hamel, Ulrich Kohlenbach, and Frank Tall for invaluable comments on
earlier versions of the manuscript.
1. Preliminaries
I. [0, 1]-valued structures and [0, 1]-valued logics
The formal definition of model-theoretic logic was given by P. Lindstro¨m in his celebrated 1969 paper [Lin69].
We start by recalling Lindstro¨m’s classical definition.
1.1. Definition. A Lindstro¨m logic L is a triple (C , SentL , |=L ), where C is a class of first-order structures
that is closed under isomorphisms, renamings and reducts, SentL is a function that assigns to every first-
order vocabulary L a set SentL (L) called the set of L-sentences of L , and |=L is a binary relation between
structures and sentences, such that the following conditions hold:
(1) If L ⊆ L′, then SentL (L) ⊆ SentL (L′).
(2) If M |=L ϕ (i.e., if M and ϕ are related under |=L ), then there is a vocabulary L such that M is an
L-structure in C and ϕ an L-sentence. If M |=L ϕ, we say that M satisfies ϕ, or that M is a model
of ϕ.
(3) Isomorphism Property. IfM,N are isomorphic structures in C , thenM |=L ϕ if and only if N |=L ϕ.
(4) Reduct Property. If L ⊆ L′, ϕ is an L-sentence, and M an L′-structure in C , then
M |=L ϕ if and only if (M ↾ L) |=L ϕ.
(5) Renaming Property. If ρ : L → L′ is a renaming (i.e., a bijection r : L → L′ that respects symbol
type and and arity), then for each L-sentence ϕ there is an L′-sentence ϕρ such that M |=L ϕ if and
only if Mρ |=L ϕρ for every L-structure M in C . (Here, Mρ denotes the structure that results from
converting M into an L′-structure through ρ.)
A classical first-order structure M consists of a nonempty universe M together with finitary functions
and relations (or “predicates”) on M . If n is a nonnegative integer, any n-ary relation on M can be seen
as a function of Mn into {0, 1}. In this paper we will deal with the more general concept of [0, 1]-valued
structure, which is defined as follows: A [0, 1]-valued structure M consists of a nonempty set M called the
universe of M, together with finitary functions and predicates on M ; but in this case, the predicates are
[0, 1]-valued, rather than {0, 1}-valued. A simple example of [0, 1]-valued structure is a pseudometric space
(M,d) of diameter bounded by 1. The universe of the structure is M and the only predicate of the structure
is d.
The following extension of Definition 1.1 was introduced by Caicedo and Iovino [CI14]:
1.2. Definition. A [0, 1]-valued logic is a triple L = (C , SentL ,V), where C is a class of [0, 1]-valued
structures that is closed under under isomorphisms, renamings and reducts, SentL is a function that assigns
to every first-order vocabulary L a set SentL (L) called the set of L-sentences of L , and V is a real-valued
partial function on C × SentL such that the following conditions hold:
(1) If L ⊆ L′, then SentL (L) ⊆ SentL (L′).
(2) For every L, the function V assigns to every pair (M, ϕ), where M is an L-structure in C and ϕ is
an L-sentence of L , a real number V(M, ϕ) = ϕM ∈ [0, 1] called the truth value of ϕ in M.
(3) Isomorphism Property for [0, 1]-valued logics. If M,N are isomorphic structures in C and ϕ is an
L-sentence of L , then ϕM = ϕN.
(4) Reduct Property for [0, 1]-valued logics. If L ⊆ L′, ϕ is an L-sentence of L , and M an L′-structure
in C , then ϕM = ϕM↾L.
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(5) Renaming Property for [0, 1]-valued logics. If ρ : L → L′ is a renaming, then for each L-sentence ϕ
of L there is an L′-sentence ϕρ such that ϕM = (ϕρ)M
ρ
for every L-structure M in C .
If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic, L is a vocabulary ϕ is an L-sentence of L and M is an L-structure in C such
that ϕM = 1, we say that M satisfies ϕ, or that M is a model of ϕ, and write M |=L ϕ.
If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic such that ϕM ∈ {0, 1} for every sentence ϕ of L and every structure M, we
say that L is a two-valued logic, or a discrete logic.
1.3. Definition. Let L be a a [0, 1]-valued logic and let L be a vocabulary.
(1) An L-theory (or simply a theory if the vocabulary is given by the context) of L is a set of L-sentences
of L .
(2) Let T be an L-theory of L . If M is an L-structure such that M |=L ϕ for each ϕ ∈ T , we say that
M is a model of T and write M |=L T .
(3) A theory is satisfiable if it has a model.
(4) If M is structure of L , the complete L -theory of M, denoted ThL (M), is the set {ϕ : M |=L ϕ }.
If L is a vocabulary, x¯ = x1, . . . , xn is a finite list of constant symbols not in L, and ϕ is an (L ∪ {x¯})-
sentence, we emphasize this by writing ϕ as ϕ(x¯). In this case we may say that ϕ(x¯) is an L-formula. If M
is an L-structure and a¯ = a1, . . . , an is a list of elements of M, we write
(M, a1, . . . , an) |=L ϕ(x1, . . . , xn),
or M |=L ϕ[a¯], if the L∪{x¯} expansion of M that results from interpreting xi as ai (for i = 1, . . . , n) satisfies
ϕ(x¯).
1.4. Definition. Let M,N be L-structures. We say that M and N are equivalent in L , and write M ≡L N,
if for every L-sentence ϕ we have φM = φN.
If M is an L-structure and A is a subset of the universe of M, we denote by L[A] the expansion of the
vocabulary L obtained by adding distinct new constant symbols ca, one for each a ∈ A. We also denote by
(M, a)a∈A the expansion of M to an L[A]-structure obtained by interpreting each ca as a. The structure
(M, a)a∈A is said to be an expansion of M by constants.
1.5. Definition. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic and let M,N be L-structures with M a substructure of N.
We say that M is an L -substructure of N or that N is an L -extension of M, and we write M L N, if
(M, a)a∈M ≡L (N, a)a∈M.
1.6. Convention. In order to avoid clutter in the notation, if a logic L is fixed, we may suppress the
subindex in symbols like ≡L , ≺L , ThL (·), etc.
II. Connectives and classical quantifiers
1.7. Definition. The  Lukasiewicz implication is the function → from [0, 1]2 into [0, 1] defined by
x→ y = min{1− x+ y, 1} for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Note that x→ y has the value 1 if and only if x ≤ y.
1.8. Definition. We will say that a [0, 1]-valued logic L is closed under the basic connectives if the following
conditions hold for every vocabulary L:
(1) If ϕ, ψ ∈ SentL (L), then there exists a sentence ϕ→ ψ in SentL (L) such that (ϕ→ ψ)M = ϕM →
ψM for every L-structure M.
(2) For each rational r ∈ [0, 1], the set SentL (L) contains a sentence with constant truth value r. These
sentences are called the Pavelka constants of L .1
1.9. Notation. If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives, ϕ is a sentence of L ,
and r is a Pavelka constant of L , we will write ϕ ≤ r, ϕ ≥ r and ϕ = r as abbreviations, respectively, of
ϕ→ r, r → ϕ and (ϕ→ r) ∧ (r → ϕ).
1The Pavelka constants are not needed (see [Cai17]), but they simplify the exposition.
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1.10. Remark. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic and let L be a vocabulary. If M is an L-structure of L , ϕ
is an L-sentence of L , and r is a Pavelka constant of L , then M |=L ϕ ≤ r if and only if ϕM ≤ r, and
M |=L ϕ ≥ r if and only if ϕM ≥ r; thus, the truth value ϕM is determined by either of the sets
{ r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] : M |=L ϕ ≤ r }, { r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] : M |=L ϕ ≥ r }.
1.11.Notation. If L is a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives and ϕ, ψ are sentences
of L , we write ¬ϕ and ϕ ∨ ψ as abbreviations, respectively, of ϕ → 0 and (ϕ → ψ) → ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ as an
abbreviation of ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ).
Note that for every L-structure M, one has
(ϕ ≤ 0)M = 1− ϕM,
(ϕ ∨ ψ)M = max{ϕM, ψM},
(ϕ ∧ ψ)M = min{ϕM, ψM}.
In particular, every [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives is closed under conjunctions
and disjunctions. On the other hand, M |= ϕ implies M 6|= ¬ϕ, but not conversely. We call ¬ϕ the
 Lukasiewicz negation or weak negation of ϕ.
We will refer to any function from [0, 1]n into [0, 1], where n is a nonnegative integer, as an n-ary connective.
The  Lukasiewicz implication and the Pavelka constants are continuous connectives, as are all the projections
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ xi. The following proposition states that any other other continuous connective can be
approximated by finite combinations of these.
1.12.Proposition. Let C be the class of connectives generated by composing the  Lukasiewicz implication, the
Pavelka constants, and the projections. Then every continuous connective is a uniform limit of connectives
in C .
Proof. Since C is closed under the connectives max{x, y} and min{x, y}, by the Stone-Weierstrass theorem
for lattices [GJ76, pp. 241-242], we only need to show that the connectives rx, where r is a dyadic rational,
can be approximated by connectives in C .
Notice that if x ∈ [0, 1],
1
2
x = lim
n
n∨
i=1
(
i
n
∧ ¬
(
x→
i
n
))
.
Hence, since the truncated sum a ⊕ b = min(a + b, 1) = ¬x → y is in C , so are all the connectives(
1
2x+ · · ·+
1
2n
)
x, for any positive integer n. 
1.13. Definition. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic. We say that L is closed under existential quantifiers if
given any L-formula ϕ(x) there exists an L-formula ∃xϕ such that for every L-structureM one has (∃xϕ)M =
supa∈M (ϕ[a]
M). Similarly, we say that L is closed under universal quantifiers if given any L-formula ϕ(x)
there exists an L-formula ∀xϕ such that for every L-structure M one has (∀xϕ)M = infa∈M (ϕ[a]
M).
III. Metric structures and logics for metric structures
1.14. Definition. A metric structure is a [0, 1]-valued structure M such that one of the predicates of M is
a metric d on the universe of M, and all the functions and predicates of M are uniformly continuous with
respect to d.
Note that classical structures are metric structures; we regard them as being endowed with the discrete
metric. The predicate for this metric is ¬(x = y). For this reason, we refer to classical structures as discrete
structures.
1.15. Definition. A logic for metric structures is a [0, 1]-valued logic L such that the structures of L are
metric structures and L is closed under the basic connectives and the existential and universal quantifiers
(see Definitions 1.8 and 1.13).
1.16. Remark. To any logic L for metric structures there corresponds a logic L˜ for discrete structures,
i.e., for models of the sentence
∀x∀y(d(x, y) = 0 ∨ d(x, y) = 1).
6 X. CAICEDO, E. DUEN˜EZ, AND J. IOVINO
It follows trivially from the definition of logic for metric structures that L˜ extends classical (discrete) first-
order logic Lωω.
IV. Examples of logics for metric structures
In Subsection VI we shall turn our attention to compactness. Examples (2)–(5) below are examples of
compact logics.
1. Two-valued logics. Certainly, any Lindstro¨m logic that is closed under the Boolean connectives and
classical quantifiers can be seen as a two-valued logic and hence as a logic for metric structures.
2. Basic continuous logic. This logic, which we will temporarily denote as Lbasic, is defined in the
following manner. The class of structures of Lbasic is the class of all metric structures. The class of sentences
of Lbasic is defined as follows. For a vocabulary L, the concept of L-term is defined as in first-order logic.
If t(x1, . . . , xn) is an L-term (where x1, . . . , xn are the variables that occur in t), M is an L-structure, and
a1, . . . , an are elements of the universe of M, the interpretation t
M[a1, . . . , an] is defined as in first-order
logic as well. The atomic formulas of L are all the expressions of the form d(t1, t2) or R(t1, . . . , tn), where
R is an n-ary predicate symbol of L. If ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is an atomic L-formula with variables x1, . . . , xn and
a1, . . . , an are elements of an L-structure M, the interpretation ϕ
M[a1, . . . , an] is defined naturally by letting
R(t1, . . . , tn)
M[a1, . . . , an] = R
M(tM1 [a1, . . . , an], . . . , t
M
n [a1, . . . , an])
and
d(t1, t2)
M[a1, . . . , an] = d
M(tM1 [a1, . . . , an], t
M
2 [a1, . . . , an])
(where dM is the metric in M). The L-formulas of Lbasic are the syntactic expressions that result from
closing the atomic formulas of L under the  Lukasiewicz implication, the Pavelka constants, and the existential
quantifier. A sentence of Lbasic is a formula without free variables, and the truth value of a L-sentence ϕ in
an L-structure M is ϕM. We write M |=Lbasic ϕ[a1, . . . , an] if ϕ[a1, . . . , an]
M = 1.
Recall that in any [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives, the expressions ¬ϕ, ϕ∨ψ,
ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ≤ r, and ϕ ≥ r are written as abbreviations of ϕ → 0, (ϕ → ψ) → ψ, ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ϕ → r, and
r → ϕ, respectively. In Lbasic we also regard ∀xϕ as an abbreviation of ¬∃x¬ϕ.
3. Full continuous logic. This logic, temporarily denoted Lfull, is the same as Lbasic above with the
difference that, instead of taking the closure under the  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka connectives, one takes the closure
under all continuous connectives (and the existential quantifier).
Proposition 1.12 yields the following remark, which allows one to transfer model-theoretic results between
Lbasic and Lfull:
1.17. Remark. For every L-formula ϕ(x¯) of Lfull and for every ǫ > 0 there exists a formula ψ(x¯) of Lbasic
such that |ϕM[a¯]− ψM[a¯]| ≤ ǫ for every complete L-structure M and every tuple a¯ in the universe M of M
with ℓ(a¯) = ℓ(x¯). It follows that if M,N are L-structures, then M ≡Lbasic N if and only if M ≡Lfull N, and
M Lbasic N if and only if M Lfull N. Moreover, every structure is equivalent in Lbasic (and Lfull) to its
metric completion.
4. The continuous logic framework of Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov. This logic is the restriction
of Lfull to the class of complete metric structures; it was introduced by Ben Yaacov and Usvyatsov [BYU10]
as a reformulation of Henson’s logic for metric spaces, based on the concept of continuous model theory
developed by Chang and Keisler [Cha61, CK66].
5.  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic. The formulas of  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic are like those of basic con-
tinuous logic, with the following difference: in place of the distinguished metric d, one uses the similarity
relation x ≈ y. However, there is a precise correspondence between the two relations, namely, d(x, y) is
1− (x ≈ y) (in other words, the two relations are weak negations of each other)—see Section 5.6 of [Ha´j98],
especially Example 5.6.3-(1). Also, in  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, for each n-ary operation symbol f , one has
the axiom
(x1 ≈ y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn ≈ yn)→ (f(x1 . . . , xn) ≈ f(y1, . . . yn)),
and similarly, for each n-ary predicate symbol R, one has the axiom
(x1 ≈ y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn ≈ yn)→ (R(x1 . . . , xn)↔ R(y1, . . . yn)),
where ‘ϕ ↔ ψ’ abbreviates ‘(ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)’ ([Ha´j98], Definition 5.6.5). Thus,  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka
logic is the restriction of basic continuous logic to the class of 1-Lipschitz structures, i.e., structures whose
operations and predicates are 1-Lipschitz.
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Historically, Pavelka extended  Lukasiewicz propositional logic by adding the rational constants, and proved
a form of approximate completeness for the resulting logic. See [Pav79a, Pav79b, Pav79c] (see also Section
5.4 of [Ha´j98].) This is known as Pavelka-style completeness.  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic is also referred
to in the literature as rational Pavelka logic, or Pavelka many-valued logic. Nova´k proved Pavelka-style
completeness for predicate  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic, which he calls “first-order fuzzy logic”, first using
ultrafilters [Nov89, Nov90], and later using a Henkin-type construction [Nov95]. Another proof of Pavelka-
style completeness for predicate  Lukasiewicz-Pavelka logic was given by Hajek ([Ha´j97] and [Ha´j98, Section
5.4]).
6. Infinitary [0, 1]-valued logics. Different [0, 1]-valued logics with infinitary formulas have been been
studied by Ben Yaacov-Iovino [BYI09], Eagle [Eag14, Eag17], Grinstead [Gri13], Sequeira [Seq13], and
Caicedo [Cai17]. See [Cai17] and [Eag17] for comparisons among these.
1.18. Convention. Throughout the rest of the paper, the symbol Lcont will denote any of the logics in
Examples (1)–(5) above.
V. Relativizations
The fact that a given predicate of a [0, 1]-structure (including the metric of a metric structure) takes on
values in {0, 1}, can be expressed using only the connectives ∨ and ¬:
1.19. Definition. Let L be a [0, 1]-valued logic that is closed under the basic connectives and let M be an
L-structure of L . Let P a predicate symbol of L or the symbol denoting the metric. We define Discrete(P )
to be the L-formula
∀x¯(P (x¯) ∨ ¬P (x¯)),
and call PM discrete if M |= Discrete
(
P ).
Let L be a vocabulary and let P (x) be a monadic predicate not in L. If M is an (L∪{P})-structure with
universe M such that PM is discrete, and a valid L-structure of L is obtained by restricting the universe of
M to {a ∈ M : M |=L P [a]}, then we denote this structure by M ↾ {x : P (x)} or M ↾ P . Note that if M is
complete, the continuity of P ensures that M ↾ P , when defined, is complete.
1.20. Definition. A [0, 1]-valued logic L permits relativization to discrete predicates if for every vocabu-
lary L, every L-sentence ϕ, and every monadic predicate symbol P not in L there exists an (L∪{P})-sentence,
denoted ϕP or ϕ{x:P (x)} and called the relativization of ϕ to P , such that the following holds: If M is an
(L ∪ {P})-structure with universe M such that PM is discrete, then
· M ↾ {x : P (x)} is an (L ∪ {P})-structure of L .
· For all c ∈M ,
(ϕP )M[c] = ϕM↾P [c].
As an example, if ϕ is an formula of Lcont, the relativization of ϕ to P can be defined by the following
recursive rule:
· If ϕ is atomic, then ϕP is ϕ.
· If ϕ is of the form C(ψ1, . . . , ψn), where C is a connective, then ϕP is C(ψP1 , . . . , ψ
P
n ).
· If ϕ is of the form ∃yψ, then ϕP is ∃y(P (y) ∧ ψP ).
· If ϕ is of the form ∀yψ, then ϕP is ∀y(¬P (y) ∨ ψP ).
One may verify that all the basic examples of [0, 1]-valued logics discussed in Subsection IV satisfy the
following stronger property:
1.21. Definition. A [0, 1]-valued logic L permits relativization to definable families of predicates if for every
vocabulary L, every L-sentence ϕ, every binary predicate symbol R not in L, and any variable y, there is
an (L ∪ {R})-formula ψ(y), denoted ϕ{x:R(x,y)} or ϕR(·,y), such that the following holds: Whenever M is an
(L ∪ {R})-structure with universe M such that for every b ∈M ,
· Either M |= R[a, b] or M |= ¬R[a, b] for every a ∈M (i.e., the collection {RM(·, b) : b ∈M} consists
of discrete predicates), and
· M ↾ {x : R(x, b)} (also denoted M ↾ R(·, b)) is defined as an L-structure of L ,
one has,
(ϕR(·,b))M = ϕM↾R(·,b) for all b ∈M.
Such formula ϕR(·,y) is a relativization of ϕ by R(x, y) with parameter y.
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1.22. Definition. We will say that a logic for metric structures is regular if it permits relativization to
definable families of predicates.
All the logics mentioned in Subsection IV and in Examples 1.28 of the next section are regular.
VI. [κ, λ]-compactness and (κ, λ)-compactness
Recall that if (X, d) and (Y, ρ) are pseudometric spaces and F : X → Y is uniformly continuous, a modulus
of uniform continuity for F is a function ∆ : (0,∞)→ [0,∞) such that, for all x, y ∈ B and ǫ > 0,
d(x, y) < ∆(ǫ) ⇒ ρ(F (x), F (y)) ≤ ǫ.
1.23. Definition. If L is a logic for metric structures and T is an L -theory, the class of models of T will
be denoted ModL (T ). An L -elementary class is a class of the form ModL (ϕ), where ϕ is a sentence.
1.24. Definition. Let L be a vocabulary and let C be a class of L-structures.
We will say that C is a uniform class if for every function symbol f of L there exists ∆f : (0,∞)→ [0,∞)
such that for every structure M of C , the function ∆ is a modulus of uniform continuity for fM. The
collection (∆f )f∈L is called a modulus of uniform continuity for C .
If L is a logic for metric structures and T is an L -theory, we will say that T is uniform if ModL (T ) is
a uniform class. We will say that a family T of L-theories is uniform if there exists a common modulus of
uniform continuity for ModL (T ) for all T ∈ T.
1.25. Remark. The definition of uniform class given above applies only to [0, 1]-valued structures. For
unbounded or non-uniformly bounded structures, a more general definition imposing local bounds in addition
to local moduli of continuity is needed [DnI17].
1.26. Definition. Let L be a logic for metric structures and let κ, λ be infinite cardinals with λ ≤ κ ≤ ∞.
(1) We will say that L is [κ, λ]-compact if the following holds: Whenever L is a vocabulary and T is a
uniformly continuous family of L-theories of L of cardinality at most κ, the union
⋃
T is satisfiable
if
⋃
T0 is satisfiable for every subfamily T0 ⊆ T of cardinality strictly less than λ. We will say that
L is compact if and only if L is [∞, ω]-compact, i.e., [κ, ω]-compact for every κ.
(2) We will say that L is (κ, λ)-compact if the following holds: Whenever L is a vocabulary and T is a
uniform L-theory of L of cardinality at most κ, we have that T is satisfiable if every subtheory of
T of cardinality strictly less than λ is satisfiable.
1.27.Remark. Clearly, [κ, λ]-compactness is stronger than (κ, λ)-compactness. However, the two properties
become equivalent if, in the definition of [κ, λ]-compactness, we consider only theories of cardinality at most κ.
Also, both are equivalent when κ =∞.
1.28. Examples. Let Lωω be first-order logic. Given a quantifier Q, we denote by Lωω(Q) the extension
of Lωω by the quantifier Q.
(1) If κ is an infinite cardinal and ∃≥κ is the quantifier that says “there exist κ-many”, then Lωω(∃
≥κ)
is [ω, ω]-compact for κ = (2ω)+, and in general [δ, δ]-compact for any κ of the form (λδ)+ [Fuh65].
In particular, first-order logic extended with the quantifier “there exist at most continuum many” is
[ω, ω]-compact. The logic Lωω(∃≥ℵ1) (i.e., first-order extended with the quantifier “there exist un-
countably many”) is known for its good behavior [Kei70, Kau85]. This logic is (ω, ω)-compact [Vau64]
but not [ω, ω]-compact [Cai99]. It is consistent to assume that Lωω(∃≥κ) is (ω, ω)-compact for all
κ > ω. See [SV] for a detailed account.
(2) Stationary logic is the extension of first-order with the second-order quantifier that says “for almost
all countable sets” (more precisely, for a close unbounded family of subsets of the universe). This
logic is (ω, ω)-compact. Stationary logic was introduced by Shelah [She71, She72], investigated in
detail by Barwise-Kaufmann-Makkai [BKM78] and further by Mekler-Shelah [MS85, MS86]).
(3) Shelah’s cofinality quantifier Qcofω such that Q
cof
ω x, y ϕ(x, y) says “ϕ(x, y) defines a linear order of
cofinality ω” gives a fully compact proper extension of first-order logic [She71]. This logic is a
sublogic of stationary logic [She85, Lemma 4.4].
(4) Other compact extensions of first-order by second order quantifiers have been studied by She-
lah [She75, She] and Mekler-Shelah [MS93].
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(5) The infinitary logic Lκκ is (κ, κ)-compact if and only if κ is weakly compact, and it is (∞, κ)-compact
if and only if κ is strongly compact.
1.29. Definition. Let X be a topological space. If κ, λ are infinite cardinals with λ ≤ κ, a topological space
is said to be [κ, λ]-compact if whenever F is a family of at most κ closed sets such that the intersection of
any subfamily of F of cardinality less than λ has nonempty intersection we must have
⋂
F 6= ∅.2 Note that
a topological space X is compact if and only if X is [∞, ω]-compact.
1.30. Remarks. If L is a vocabulary, the class of L-structures of L can be regarded as a topological space
naturally by letting the classes of the form ModL (T ), where T is an L-theory, be the closed classes of the
topology (in other words, elementary L -classes are the basic closed sets).
Clearly, L is [κ, λ]-compact if and only if the class of L-structures of L is [κ, λ]-compact for every
vocabulary L. In particular, L is [ω, ω]-compact if and only if, for every vocabulary L, the class of L-
structures of L is countably compact. It is easy to verify that if λ < κ, then [κ, λ]-compactness is equivalent
to [δ, δ]-compactness for all regular δ such that λ ≤ δ ≤ κ (see [Vau75]).
For general compact extensions of Lωω from a topological viewpoint see [Cai99, Cai93].
1.31. Remark. The nomenclature for square-bracket compactness is not unified in logic and topology. The
term “countable compactness” corresponds to [ω, ω]-compactness in topology and to (ω, ω)-compactness in
logic. Also, [λ, κ]-compactness in topology, corresponds to [κ, λ]-compactness in logic. For the rest of this
paper, we will adhere to the usage within logic.
2. [κ, κ]-compactness and cofinality
Recall that a logic for metric structures is regular if it permits relativization to definable families of
predicates (see Definitions 1.21 and 1.22).
The following theorem is a version for metric structures of a theorem of Makowsky and Shelah [MS79].
2.1. Theorem. Let L be a logic for metric structures and let κ be a regular cardinal. Then (1) below implies
(2). If L is regular, (2) implies (1).
(1) L is [κ, κ]-compact.
(2) If L is a vocabulary containing a monadic predicate symbol P , a binary predicate symbol ⊳, and a
family (α : α < κ) of constant symbols, then every satisfiable uniform theory of L extending the
theory Tκ consisting of the sentences
· Discrete(P ), Discrete(⊳), plus
· expressing that ⊳ is a linear order on the truth set of P , and
· P (α), α⊳ β, for α < β < κ,
necessarily has a model M such that (αM : α < κ) is not cofinal in (PM,⊳M).
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Let L be [κ, κ]-compact and let T be a satisfiable uniform theory extending Tκ. For
δ < κ and a new constant c, the theory Tδ = T ∪ {P (c)} ∪ {α < c : α < δ} has a model (e.g., the expansion
of a model M of Tκ obtained upon interpreting c by δ). By the hypothesis of [κ, κ]-compactness,
⋃
δ<κ Tδ is
satisfiable and thus has a model that evidently satisfies the requirements.
(2)⇒ (1): Assume that κ is regular and L is not [κ, κ]-compact. Fix a uniform family T = {Tα}α<κ of
κ many L-theories of L such that
⋃
T′ is satisfiable for every subfamily T′ ⊆ T having strictly fewer than κ
elements, but
⋃
T is not satisfiable. Without loss of generality, we can assume Tα ⊆ Tβ for α < β < κ. We
can also assume that every Tα contains sentences specifying the uniform continuity modulus for T (which is
common to all Tα). Let L
′ extend L with new symbols P , ⊳, and (α : α < κ) per the hypotheses of (2), plus
a binary predicate symbol R. Let T = Tκ ∪ {Discrete(R)} ∪
{
∀y
(
P (y) ∧ α⊳ y → ϕR(·,y)
)
: ϕ ∈ Tα, α < κ
}
.
We construct a model of T as follows. For each α < κ, let Mα be a model of Tα. Consider the structure
(κ,<) as a discrete linear order. Let M be the L′-structure such that:
· The universe M of M is the disjoint union κ ⊔
⊔
α<κMα.
· αM = α for each α < κ.
2This concept was introduced in topology by Alexandroff and Urysohn [AU29]. Smirnov took up its systematic study
and considered variations of the definition [Smi50, Smi51], as done later by Ga´l [Ga´l57, Ga´l58] and Noble [Nob71]. For a
comprehensive introduction (including detailed comparisons among the variants introduced by Smirnov, Gaal, and Noble), see
Vaughan’s paper [Vau75].
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· The distance between elements of
⊔
α<κMα in the same Mα is as given by the metric of Mα, and
the distance between distinct elements of
⊔
α<κMα not in the same Mα is 1.
· For any α < κ, the distance between α and any other element of M is 1.
· If Q is an n-ary predicate symbol of L, the interpretation QM is
⊔
α<κQ
Mα in
⊔
i<κM
n
α and 0 in
Mn \
⊔
α<κM
n
α .
· If f is an n-ary operation symbol of L, and a¯ ∈ Mn, then fM(a¯) is fMα(a¯) if a ∈ Mnα and 0 (the
least element of κ) if a¯ ∈Mn \
⊔
α<κM
n
α .
· PM is the characteristic function of κ.
· ⊳M is the characteristic function of { (α, β) : α < β < κ }.
· RM is the characteristic function of
⋃
α<κ(Mα × {α}).
Note that M ↾ R(·, α) ≃ Mα for each α < κ; thus, M ↾ R(·, α) |= ϕ for ϕ ∈ Tα. By the hypothesis of
regularity of L (Definitions 1.21 and 1.22),
(*) M |= ∀y
((
P (y) ∧ α⊳ y
)
→ ϕR(·,y)
)
,
since the collection {Tα} is an ascending chain. This shows that M is a model of T , so T is satisfiable.
Moreover, if M′ is any model of T , then {αM
′
}α<κ is cofinal in (P
′, <′) = (PM
′
,⊳M
′
): Otherwise, there
would be µ ∈ P ′ with αM
′
⊳′µ for all α < κ, hence
M
′ ↾ R(·, µ) |=
⋃
T,
by (*), contradicting the unsatisfiability of
⋃
T. 
2.2. Theorem. Let L be a logic for metric structures and let κ be a regular cardinal. Then (1) below implies
(2). If L is regular, (2) implies (1).
(1) L is (κ, κ)-compact.
(2) As (2) of Theorem 2.1, but stated for theories of L of cardinality κ.
Proof. (1)⇒ (2): The corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2.1 applies verbatim.
(2)⇒ (1): The proof of Theorem 2.1 is adapted as follows. The failure of (κ, κ)-compactness is witnessed
by an non-satisfiable family T = {ϕα}α<κ of sentences all whose subfamilies of cardinality less than κ are
satisfiable. The theory T = Tκ ∪ {Discrete(R)} ∪
{
∀y
(
P (y) ∧ α⊳ y → ϕ
R(·,y)
α : α < κ
)}
of cardinality κ has
the desired properties, by the same earlier argument. 
3. Metastability and uniform metastability
This section is concerned with connections between compactness of a logic L for metric structures and
the notion of metastable convergence of nets in metric spaces, i.e., in suitable structures of L . Metastability
is a reformulation of the Cauchy property for nets, i.e., a net in a metric space is metastable if and only if
it is Cauchy. However, for a collection of nets, being uniformly metastable is weaker than being uniformly
Cauchy. The main results of this section are Theorem 3.14 and Theorem 3.15, which may be roughly stated
as follows: A logic L for metric structures is compact if and only if every theory of convergence in L is a
theory of uniformly metastable convergence.
I. Metastability: Basic definitions and examples
The following paragraphs describe the metastable viewpoint of convergence first introduced by Tao [Tao08].
The reader is referred to our earlier paper for details [DnI17].
3.1. Definition (Samplings of a directed set). A directed set is a nonempty set D with a non-strict partial
order  such that every two elements of D have an upper bound but D has no largest element. For i ∈ D,
let Di = {j ∈ D : i  j}. A sampling of D is a collection η = (ηi : i ∈ D) of nonempty finite subsets of D
such that ηi ⊆ Di for every i ∈ D.
3.2. Definition (Metastable net). Let (D,) be a directed set and (Y, d) a metric space. A D-net in Y is a
collection a• = (ai : i ∈ D) of elements of Y . A D-net a• in Y is said to be metastable if for every ǫ > 0 and
every sampling η there exists i ∈ D such that d(aj , ak) ≤ ǫ for all j, k ∈ ηi. The net a• is said to be pointed
metastable if there is b ∈ Y such that, for every ǫ > 0 and every sampling η, there exists i ∈ D such that
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d(aj , b) ≤ ǫ for all j ∈ ηi. In this case, a• is said to be metastable near b. In either case above, i is said to
witness the (pointed) [ǫ, η]-metastability (near b) of a•.
3.3. Proposition.
(1) A net is Cauchy if and only if it is metastable.
(2) A net is pointed metastable (near b) if and only if it is convergent (to b); in particular, a net is
metastable near no more than one point, necessarily its limit.
Proof. (1) [DnI17, Proposition 1.5].
(2) Routine adaptation of the proof of (1). 
3.4. Definition. A rate of metastability E• for samplings of the directed set D is a collection E• = (Eǫ,η) of
nonempty finite subsets of D, indexed by positive reals ǫ > 0 and samplings η of D.
A net a• in (X, d) is E•-metastable (or admits the rate E• of metastable convergence [near b]) if, for every
ǫ > 0 and every sampling η, the [ǫ, η]-metastability [near b] of a• has a witness i ∈ Eǫ,η.
Given a collection A of D-nets in a metric space (Y, d), we say that
· A is E•-uniformly metastable (or A admits the uniform rate E• of metastable convergence) if every
a• ∈ A is E•-metastable.
· A is E•-uniformly metastable near b• (or A admits the uniform rate E• of metastable convergence
near b•) if b• is a collection (ba : a• ∈ A) of points in Y such that every a• ∈ A is E•-metastable
near ba.
We say that A is pointed E•-uniformly metastable if A is E•-uniformly metastable near some b•. We also
say that A is Cauchy (resp., is convergent) if every a• ∈ A is Cauchy (resp., is convergent)
3.5. Proposition. If A is pointed E•-uniformly metastable, then A is E˜•-uniformly metastable, where E˜ǫ,η =
Eǫ/2,η.
The converse of Proposition 3.5 fails, as shown by family B0 in Remarks 3.6 below.
Proof. For a• ∈ A, if i ∈ Eǫ,η witnesses the pointed [ǫ/2, η]-metastability of a• (necessarily near its limit b ∈
X , by Proposition 3.3 (2)), the same i witnesses the [ǫ, η]-metastability of a•, since for j, k ∈ ηi we have
d(aj , ak) ≤ d(aj , b) + d(ak, b) ≤ ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ. 
3.6. Remarks.
(1) Evidently, if a net a• admits some rate E• of metastability, then a• is metastable, hence Cauchy by
Proposition 3.3; in particular, every uniformly metastable family A is a Cauchy family that is not
uniformly Cauchy. Similarly, every pointed uniformly metastable family is a convergent family.
(2) Conversely, every metastable (i.e., Cauchy) net a• admits some rate E• of metastability. Since such
net is Cauchy by Proposition 3.3, given ǫ > 0 there is i = iǫ ∈ D such that d(aj , ak) ≤ ǫ for
all j, k ∈ Di, so it suffices to chose Eǫ,η = {iǫ}. Note that Eǫ,η so chosen is independent of the
sampling η. Similarly, every convergent net admits some rate of metastability near its limit (and
only near its limit, by Proposition 3.3).
(3) On the other hand, if a family A of nets admits a uniform rate of metastability E• = (Eǫ,η) such
that Eǫ,η = Eǫ is independent of the sampling η, then for every ǫ > 0 there is an upper bound iǫ for
the finite set Eǫ. By considering samplings η with ηl = {j, k} for all l ∈ Eǫ, we see that d(aj , ak) ≤ ǫ
for all j, k ≥ iǫ and all a• ∈ A, hence A is uniformly Cauchy in the classical sense. Similarly, if A is
pointed E•-uniformly metastable with rates Eǫ independent of the sampling, then A is a convergent
family whose limits are approached uniformly in the classical sense.
(4) The family B of non-increasing D-nets in the discrete space {0, 1} (i.e., a• in {0, 1} satisfying ai ≥ aj
if i  j) admits the uniform metastability rate E• = (Eǫ,η) given by Eǫ,η = Eη = {k, l} (independent
of ǫ), where k is a completely arbitrary element of D (e.g., the smallest element thereof, if one exists),
and l ∈ D is any upper bound on ηk; namely, for 0 < ǫ < 1, we show that the [ǫ, η]-metastability of
any a• ∈ A is witnessed by either k or l. Indeed, a• is either constant or not constant on ηk: In the
former case, the [ǫ, η]-metastability of a• is witnessed by k; in the latter, aj = 0 for some j ∈ ηk so, by
monotonicity and the choice of l, it follows that a• is identically zero on ηl; thus, the metastability
is witnessed by l. The family B is uniformly metastable (and hence Cauchy) but not uniformly
Cauchy. By removing the constant net 1• = (1 : i ∈ D) from B, one obtains a subfamily B0, still
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E•-uniformly metastable, consisting of nets that are eventually zero (hence all convergent to zero).
However, B0 is not uniformly metastable near zero: Given any fixed finite subset S of D, the family
B0 contains a net taking the constant value 1 on S. (Of course, the full family B is not pointed
uniformly metastable either.)
(5) By contrast, the Cauchy family C of all {0, 1}-valued eventually-zero D-nets (i.e., D-nets a• for which
there exists i ∈ D such that aj = 0 for all j  i) is not uniformly metastable. (A fortiori, C is not
uniformly metastable near 0.) Indeed, given any nonempty finite subset S of D, let k be an upper
bound for S in D, and let l  k (l 6= k). Fix any sampling η of D such that ηi = {k, l} for all i ∈ S.
Let a• be an arbitrary {0, 1}-valued eventually-zero D-net with ak = 1 and ai = 0 for i  l. By
construction of k, l, η, a•, we have a• ∈ C, but the [ǫ, η]-metastability of a• has no witness i ∈ S if
0 < ǫ < 1. Since this holds for arbitrary nonempty S ⊆ D, we see that no rate Eǫ,η applies to C
uniformly, so C is not uniformly metastable.
(6) For any infinite cardinal κ (regarded as the ordered set of its ordinal predecessors) and ordinal α < κ,
consider the κ-sequence a
(α)
• = (a
(α)
i : i < κ) defined by
a
(α)
i =
{
0, if i ≤ α, and i is even (or a limit ordinal),
1, if i > α, or i is an odd (successor) ordinal.
The family D = {a
(α)
• : α < κ} consists of sequences all converging to 1. However, D is not pointed
uniformly metastable. Consider the sampling η = (ηα : α < κ) of κ given by ηα = {α, α + 1}. For
0 < ǫ < 1, the [ǫ, η]-metastability of a
(α)
• near 1 has no witness i < α; in particular, no rate of
pointed [ǫ, η]-metastability applies uniformly to the family D, which is thus not pointed uniformly
metastable. (Interchanging the roles of 1 and 0, the family D is a subfamily of C in (5) above, for
the directed set (κ,<).)
3.7. Proposition. Fix a directed set (D,) and a metric space (Y, d). Let A be any collection of convergent
D-nets in Y . For any a• ∈ A, let ba ∈ Y denote its limit. Let A˜ = {d(a•, ba) : a• ∈ A} be the collection of
real D-nets d(a•, ba) = (d(ai, ba) : i ∈ D). Every net d(a•, ba) ∈ A˜ converges to zero. If A˜ is E•-uniformly
metastable near zero, then A is pointed E•-uniformly metastable (with the same rate E•, near b•).
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. 
3.8. Definition. The product of two directed sets (D,), (E,≤) is (D× E,⊑), where
(i, j) ⊑ (k, l) iff i  k and j ≤ l,
for all i, k ∈ D, j, l ∈ E. One verifies immediately that (D× E,⊑) is a directed set.
Given a D-net a• = (ai : i ∈ D) and an E-net b• = (bj : j ∈ E), both in the same metric space (Y, d), their
mutual distance is the real (D× E)-net
d(a•, b•) := (d(ai, bj) : (i, j) ∈ D× E).
The (D× D)-net d(a•, a•) will be called the self-distance of a•.
With the definition above, a net is Cauchy iff its self-distance converges to 0.
3.9. Definition. An explicit majorization for a directed set (D,) is a mapping (i, j) 7→ i > j from D × D
to D such that i> j  i and i> j  j for all i, j ∈ D.
Given a sampling η and an explicit majorization > for D, the collection ηˇ := (ηi>j × ηi>j : (i, j) ∈ D×D)
is a sampling of D× D naturally induced by η via >.
If S is any subset of D× D, let
S> := {i> j : (i, j) ∈ S}.
Given any rate of uniform metastability E• = (Eǫ,ζ)ǫ,ζ for (D × D)-nets, the collection E>• :=
(
(Eǫ,ηˇ)
>
)
ǫ,η
is a naturally induced rate of uniform metastability for D-nets.
3.10. Proposition. Let (D,) be a directed set with explicit majorization >.
For every nonempty finite subset S ⊆ D × D, all ǫ > 0, all samplings η of D and all D-nets c• (in some
metric space), if S is a rate of pointed [ǫ, ηˇ]-metastability for the real (D× D)-net d(c•, c•) near 0, then S>
is a rate of [ǫ, η]-metastability for c•.
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In particular, if E• is a rate of pointed metastability for d(c•, c•) near 0, then E
>
• is a rate of metastability
for c•.
Proof. By the definitions of ηˇ and S>, if d(c•, c•) admits S as a rate of [ǫ, ηˇ]-metastability near 0, then there
exists (k, l) ∈ S such that, for all i, j ∈ ηk>l, we have d(ci, cj) ≤ ǫ. The element k > l ∈ S> thus witnesses
the [ǫ, η]-metastability of c•. 
II. Uniform metastability from a topological viewpoint
The following proposition is a purely topological analogue of the Uniform Metastability Principle [DnI17,
Proposition 2.4], and of the main result of the Avigad-Iovino paper on ultraproducts and metastability [AI13,
Theorem 2.1].
3.11. Proposition (Topological Uniform Metastability Principle). Let X be a topological space, and κ an
infinite cardinal. If X is [κ, ω]-compact and (D,) is a directed set with card(D) ≤ κ, then the following
conditions are equivalent for any D-net f• = (fi : i ∈ D) of continuous functions from X into a metric space
(Y, d):
(1) The nets f•(x) = (fi(x) : i ∈ D) for x ∈ X are all Cauchy.
(2) The family A = {f•(x) : x ∈ X} is uniformly metastable.
The following properties are also equivalent:
(3) The nets f•(x) for x ∈ X are all convergent.
(4) The family A is pointed uniformly metastable.
In particular, if (Y, d) is complete, properties (1)–(4) above are all equivalent.
Without a suitable hypothesis such as that of [κ, ω]-compactness, the preceding equivalence fails, since
an arbitrary Cauchy family (which can always be regarded as a family of continuous functions on a discrete
space X) need not be uniformly metastable (e.g., families C, D in Remarks 3.6 above).
Proof. The implications (1) ⇒ (2) and (3) ⇒ (4) hold without any hypotheses on X , by Propositions 3.3
and 3.5, and Remark 3.6 (1).
(4)⇒ (3): Assume that X is [κ, ω]-compact and A is a family of convergent nets, and let g : X → Y be
the pointwise limit of f•. For the sake of contradiction, assume that A is not pointed uniformly metastable.
By Proposition 3.3, every net f•(x) may only be pointed metastable near its limit g(x), so A must not be
uniformly [ǫ, η]-metastable near g for some ǫ > 0 and sampling η of D. This means that no finite subset
of D is a uniform rate of pointed [ǫ, η]-metastability for A; thus, given a nonempty finite subset S of D, there
exists a ∈ X such that
dk(a) := max
{
d(fi(a), g(a)) : i ∈ ηk
}
> ǫ for k ∈ S;
hence, a ∈
⋂
k∈S Ck, where Ck = {x ∈ X : dk(x) ≥ ǫ} is a closed subset ofX by continuity of the functions fi.
Thus, the family (Ck : k ∈ D) has the finite-intersection property. Since card(D) ≤ κ, by [κ, ω]-compactness
of X there exists an element c ∈
⋂
k∈D Ck. By construction of c, the net f•(c) = (fi(c) : i ∈ D) is not
[δ, η]-metastable, contradicting the assumption that f•(c) converges to g(c).
(2)⇒ (1): If necessary, identify Y with a subset of its metric completion Y . Assume the nets f•(x) are
Cauchy for all x ∈ X . Since any Cauchy net in Y ⊆ Y converges in Y , the pointwise limit g of f• exists as
a function X → Y . By the implication (4) ⇒ (3), the family A is pointed uniformly metastable, albeit the
pointwise limit g takes values in Y and not necessarily in Y . Since the inclusion Y ⊆ Y is isometric, the
family A is uniformly metastable by Proposition 3.5. 
For nets of bounded real functions, we may strengthen Proposition 3.11 to an equivalence under additional
hypotheses on the domain X :3
3.12. Proposition. If X is a regular paracompact topological space, then the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
(1) X is countably compact.
3We do not assume that regular spaces or paracompact spaces are Hausdorff; in particular, the class of paracompact spaces
includes all pseudometric spaces.
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(2) If (D,) is a directed set, and f• = (fi : i ∈ D) is a D-net of continuous functions fi from X into
am complete metric space, then the family A = {f•(x) : x ∈ X} is pointed uniformly metastable if
and only if each of the nets f•(x) (x ∈ X) converges.
(3) If f• = (fn : n < ω) is an ω-sequence of continuous functions from X into [0, 1], then the family
A = {f•(x) : x ∈ X} is pointed uniformly metastable if and only if each of the sequences f•(x)
(x ∈ X) converges.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Paracompact spaces that are countably compact are compact [Die44]. Hence, asser-
tion (2) follows from the the equivalence of (3) and (4) in Proposition 3.11.
(2)⇒ (3): Immediate.
(3) ⇒ (1): By contraposition, assume that X is paracompact and regular, but not countably compact.
Then, there is a strictly increasing sequence U0 ( U1 ( · · · ( Un ( · · · of nonempty open sets such that
X =
⋃
n Un. Every paracompact space is a shrinking space, so one may further assume that the collection
(Un : n < ω) is locally finite, and Un ( Un+1 [Mun00, Lemma 41.6]. By regularity, we may choose nonempty
open sets W0,W1, . . . ,Wn, . . . satisfying:
W0 ⊆ U0,
Wn+1 ⊆ Un+1 \ Un,
and a point xn ∈Wn for each n. Clearly, (Wn : n < ω) is a locally finite family of pairwise disjoint sets. Every
regular paracompact space is completely regular (this is an elementary exercise), so there exist continuous
functions gn : X → [0, 1] such that gα(xα) = 1 and gα(X \Wα) = 0. For n < ω, let hn =
∑
i<n gi. We may
also define a function h : X → [0,∞] by
(†) h(x) :=
∑
n<ω
gn(x) for each x ∈ X .
Indeed, by construction of the functions gn and the sets Wn, for fixed x ∈ X there is at most one non-zero
term in the sum on the right-hand side of equation (†), so h and each of the functions hn take values in [0, 1].
Moreover, each x ∈ X has an open neighborhood Un intersecting only finitely many of the sets Wm, hence
the supports of only finitely many of the gn’s. Thus, h is continuous on X .
For arbitrary n < ω, let
fn =
{
hn, if n is odd,
h, if n is even.
Clearly, limn fn(x) = h(x) for all x ∈ X , so f• = (fn : n < ω) is pointwise convergent. However, for
fixed n < ω, the sequence f•(xn) := (fi(xn) : i < ω) is precisely the sequence a
(n)
• in the last of Remarks 3.6
(for κ = ω). Thus, (f•(xn) : n < ω) is not pointed uniformly metastable; a fortiori, neither is the larger
family {f•(x) : x ∈ X}. 
III. The Main Theorem: Uniform metastability and logical compactness
In this subsection, we connect the Uniform Metastability Principle with the notion of [κ, λ]-compactness for
logics introduced in Section 1-VI.
3.13. Definition. Let (D,) be a directed set, let L be a logic for metric structures, and let T be a uniform
L-theory of L , where L is a vocabulary.
Given a D-net ϕ• = (ϕi : i ∈ D) of L-sentences, we say that ϕ• is
· Cauchy (convergent) modulo T if the D-net ϕM• = (ϕ
M
i : i ∈ D) in [0, 1] is Cauchy (convergent) in
every model M of T . If ϕM• is convergent, let limϕ
M
• denote its limit; we shall say that ϕ
M
• converges
to it.
· uniformly metastable modulo T if there exists a metastability rate that applies uniformly to all nets
ϕM• obtained from models M of T .
· pointed uniformly metastable modulo T if all nets ϕM• are convergent, and a fixed metastability rate
applies to ϕM• near limϕ
M
• as M ranges over models of T .
Given a D-indexed family t• = (ti : i ∈ D) of L-terms, we say that t• is
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· Cauchy (convergent) modulo T if the net tM• = (t
M
i : i ∈ D) is Cauchy (convergent) in every
model M of T ; the limit of such a Cauchy net (taken in the metric completion M of M if necessary)
is denoted lim tM• .
· uniformly metastable modulo T if the collection of all nets tM• , as M varies over all models of T , is
uniformly metastable
· pointed uniformly metastable modulo T if all nets tM• are convergent, and a fixed metastability rate
applies to tM• near lim t
M
• as M varies over all models of T .
The implication (1) ⇒ (3) of the following theorem is a generalization of the Uniform Metastability
Principle for continuous first-order logic [DnI17].
3.14. Theorem. Let L be a regular logic for metric spaces. The following properties are equivalent for any
infinite cardinal κ:
(1) L is [κ, ω]-compact.
(2) The following pointed Uniform Metastability Principle holds for the logic L and all directed sets (D,)
of cardinality at most κ: If T is a uniform L-theory of L and ϕ• is a D-net consisting of no more than
κ-many L-sentences, then ϕ• is Cauchy modulo T if and only if ϕ• is pointed uniformly metastable
modulo T .
(3) The following Uniform Metastability Principle holds for the logic L and all directed sets (D,) of
cardinality at most κ: If t• = (ti : i ∈ D) is a collection of L-terms, and T is any uniform L-theory
of L , then t• is Cauchy modulo T if and only if t• is uniformly metastable modulo T .
Proof. (1)⇒ (2): Assume that L is [κ, ω]-compact. Fix a directed set (D,) of cardinality at most κ, let
ϕ• be a D-net of L -sentences, and let T be a uniform L-theory of L such that ϕ• is convergent modulo T .
The space X = ModL (T ) of models of T carries the logic topology whose sub-basic closed sets are those
of the form ModL (ψ) = {M ∈ X : M |= ψ}, where ψ is an L-sentence. Since L is closed under the basic
connectives, each mapping ψ : X → [0, 1] given by M 7→ ψM (the truth value of ψ in M) is continuous
because, for any closed sub-basic [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1], we have
{M ∈ X : ψM ∈ [a, b]} = ModL (a ≤ ψ ∧ ψ ≤ b).
Thus, ϕ• is identified with the D-net (ϕi : i ∈ D) of continuous functions X → [0, 1]. Assertion (2) now
follows from Proposition 3.11.
(2)⇒ (3): Assume that the UniformMetastability Principle (2) holds in L for directed sets of cardinality
at most κ. Let L, t•, T satisfy the hypotheses of (3) for some directed set (D,) of cardinality at most κ.
Fix an explicit majorization > for D. Since D is infinite, card(D × D) = card(D) ≤ κ. Let ϕij be the
formula d(ti, tj) for (i, j) ∈ D × D. The hypothesis that t• is Cauchy modulo T implies that ϕ• converges
to 0 modulo T . By assumption (2) (the pointed UMP), ϕ• is uniformly metastable near 0 modulo T ; thus,
the (D×D)-nets d(tM• , t
M
• ) all admit a uniform rate E• = (Eǫ,ζ) of metastability near zero as M varies over
models of T . By Proposition 3.10, t• admits the uniform rate of metastability E
>
• modulo T . This proves
that ϕ• is E•-uniformly metastable modulo T .
(3) ⇒ (1): By contraposition, assume that L is not [κ, ω]-compact. Then L is not [µ, µ]-compact for
some regular µ ≤ κ, by the last of Remarks 1.30. Let T be a uniform L-theory extending Tµ in part (2)
of Theorem 2.1 such that (αM : α < µ) is cofinal in (PM,⊳M) for all models M of T . Expand L to a
vocabulary L′ having a unary function symbol f and a family c• = (cα : α < µ) of constants not used by
the theory T . Let T ′ be the union of T and the axioms:
∀x
(
d(f(x), 0) = 0 ∨ d(f(x), 1) = 0
)
,(1a)
∀x
(
¬P (x)→ d(f(x), 0) = 0
)
,(1b)
(∃x ∈ P )(∀y ∈ P )
(
x < y → d(f(y), 0) = 0
)
,(1c)
d(cα, f(α)) = 0, for each α < µ.(1d)
T ′ is a uniform L′-theory since T (hence T ′) implies a modulus of uniform continuity for interpretations of P
by hypothesis (thus, since P is discrete, {x : P (x) = 0} is uniformly separated from {x : P (x) = 1}), and
clearly T ′ implies the same modulus of uniform continuity for interpretations of f . Note that if M′ is any
model of T ′, then the µ-sequence cM
′
• = (c
M
α : α < µ) is eventually zero, by axioms (1c) and (1d) above.
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Consider an arbitrary eventually-zero µ-sequence b• = (bα : α < µ) in {0, 1}. Since (µ,<) is well ordered,
there is a least γ < µ such that bα = 0 for all α ≥ γ. Since T uses neither f nor the constants cα, every
model M of T admits an expansion to a model M′ = M′b• of T
′ as follows. Let cM
′
α = bα for α < µ, and let
fM
′
be the following function M → {0, 1} that takes the value 0 outside PM and, for x ∈ PM,
· f(x) = bα, if x = α
M for some α < µ,
· f(x) = 0, if x ∈ PM and x ≥ γM,
· f(x) = 1, for all other elements x ∈ PM.
Conversely, in any model M′ of T ′ the map fM
′
is {0¯, 1¯}-valued and eventually zero in (PM
′
,⊳M
′
), by
axioms (1a) and (1c) above. Since (αM
′
: α < µ) is cofinal in PM
′
, axiom (1d) implies that the binary
sequence cM
′
• is also eventually zero. In sum, when M
′ runs through all models of T ′, the sequence cM
′
•
runs through the family C, introduced in Remarks 3.6, of all binary sequences of length µ with limit
zero. The family C is Cauchy but not uniformly metastable, so c• is Cauchy but not uniformly metastable
modulo T ′. 
Theorem 3.14 characterizes [κ, ω]-compactness. We now observe that a slight modification of its proof
yields an analogous characterization of the weaker property of (κ, ω)-compactness (see Remark 1.27):
3.15. Theorem. Let L be a regular logic for metric spaces. The following properties are equivalent for any
infinite cardinal κ:
(1) L is (κ, ω)-compact.
(2) As in (2) of Theorem 3.14, with the additional condition that the cardinality of T is at most κ.
(3) As in (3) of Theorem 3.14, with the additional condition that the cardinality of T is at most κ.
Proof. (1)⇒ (2): Let X = ModL (T ), and for each L-sentence ψ, let ψ : X → [0, 1] be the mapping given
by M 7→ ψM. Give X the initial topology making all mappings ϕi : X → [0, 1] (i ∈ D) continuous (which
is coarser than that in the proof of Theorem 3.14). The collection of all the classes {M ∈ X : ϕMi ∈ [a, b]}
for i ∈ D and a, b rational with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 is a subbasis of cardinality ≤ κ for the closed sets of this
topology. Since |T | ≤ κ, the (κ, ω)-compactness of L implies that every countable collection of L-sentences
of cardinality ≤ κ that is finitely jointly satisfiable with T is jointly satisfiable with T . By considering
collections of sentences of the form “a ≤ ϕi ≤ b”, we see that any family of subbasic closed sets having
the finite-intersection property has nonempty intersection; this suffices to conclude that X is compact.
Assertion (2) now follows from Proposition 3.11 as in the proof of Theorem 3.14.
(2)⇒ (3): Identical to the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 3.14.
(3) ⇒ (1): Assume that L is regular and not (κ, ω)-compact, and let µ be least such that L is not
(µ, ω)-compact. It is easy to see that L is not (µ, µ)-compact and µ is regular. By Theorem 2.2 there
is a satisfiable theory T extending Tµ with |T | ≤ µ in all whose models M the µ-sequence cM• is cofinal
in (PM,⊳M). The rest of the proof is identical to the corresponding one in Theorem 3.14. 
3.16.Remark. In Theorems 3.14 and 3.15, the regularity assumption on the logic is needed only in (3)⇒ (1)
to invoke Theorem 2.1. The other implications hold for arbitrary logics. The forward direction of both
theorems, namely, (1) ⇒ (2), it sufficed to invoke the topological version of the UMP (Proposition 3.11).
However, for the converse, we could not rely solely on topology because topological spaces that arise from
logics need not be paracompact (see [Cai93] for examples).
4. Compactness and RPC∆-characterizability of general structures
If L,L′ are vocabularies with L ⊆ L′ and M is an L′-structure, the L-reduct of M will be denoted M ↾ L.
We will use the restriction symbol ↾ with a second meaning: If M is an L-structure and A is a subset of the
universe of M that is L-closed, i.e., for every n < ω, the set An is closed under all the n-ary functions of M,
then M ↾ A will denote the substructure of M that results from restricting, for every n < ω, all the n-ary
functions and predicates of M to A.
Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 below are classical.
4.1. Definition. Let L be a logic for metric structures and let L be a vocabulary. A class C of L-structures
is said to be a projective class (or PC ) in L if there exists a vocabulary L′ ⊇ L and an L -elementary class
C ′ of L′-structures such that
C = {M ↾ L : M ∈ C ′}.
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Intuitively, a class is PC in Lcont if and only if it is definable by an existential second-order sentence.
Thus, the concept of projective class can be seen as a generalization of this notion of definability to arbitrary
logics.
4.2. Definition. Let L be a logic for metric structures and let L be a vocabulary. A class C of L-structures
is a relativized projective class (or RPC ) in L if there exist a vocabulary L′ ⊇ L, an L -elementary class C ′
of L′-structures, and a monadic predicate symbol R of L′ such that R is discrete in each structure M ∈ C ′,
and
C = {(M ↾ L) ↾ RM : M ∈ C ′ and R is L-closed in M}.
The notions of PC∆ and RPC∆ are defined by replacing “L -elementary” with “L -axiomatizable” in the
definitions of PC and RPC, respectively.
4.3. Proposition. If κ is a regular cardinal and L is [κ, κ]-compact logic for metric structures, then the
structure (κ,<) is not RPC∆in L .
Proof. Assume that L is [κ, κ]-compact. By Theorem 2.1, any RPC∆definition of (κ,<) via discrete predi-
cate symbols P and ⊳ must have a model M such that (κ,<) embeds non-cofinally into (PM,⊳M). Hence,
(PM,⊳M) has a proper initial segment of cardinality at least κ. This prevents (PM,⊳M) ∼= (κ,<). 
4.4. Proposition. Let L be a regular logic for metric structures. If the structure (ω,<) is non RPC∆ in L ,
then L is [ω, ω]-compact.
Proof. Assume that L is not [ω, ω]-compact. By Theorem 2.1, there exists an L -theory T in a vocabulary
L containing a monadic predicate symbol P , a binary predicate symbol ⊳, and a family (cn)n<ω of constant
symbols such that if M = (M,PM, <, cMn . . . )n<ω is a model of T , then P
M is discrete, (PM, <) is a discrete
linear order and (cMn )n<ω is a cofinal sequence in (P
M, <). Let L′ be an expansion of L that contains a new
monadic predicate symbol R and let T ′ be the L′-theory that consists of T plus the following sentences:
· Discrete(R),
· ∀x¯(R(x¯)→ P (x¯)),
· R(cn), for each n < ω,
· ∀x((cn ⊳ x⊳ cn+1)→ ¬R(x)), for each n < ω.
If N is a model of T ′, then the restriction (N ↾ L) ↾ R is isomorphic to (ω <). 
4.5. Corollary. The following conditions are equivalent for any regular logic L for metric structures:
(1) L is [ω, ω]-compact.
(2) The structure (ω,<) is not RPC∆ in L .
Proof. Immediate from Propositions 4.3 and 4.4. 
The goal of the rest of this section is to prove an analog of the preceding corollary with (ω,<) replaced
with an arbitrary infinite structure.
4.6. Definition. If L is a logic for metric structures, a structure M of L with universeM will be called full
if, for every n < ω, every uniformly continuous function Mn →M and every uniformly continuous predicate
Mn → [0, 1] is definable in ThL (M).
The following lemma is a slight improvement of a theorem of Makowsky and Shelah [MS83, Theorem 1.1].
4.7. Lemma. Let M be a discrete full structure with universe M , and let Mˆ be an Lωω-extension of M.
Let P be a subset of M and assume that the natural extension Pˆ of P to Mˆ is a proper superset of P . Fix
b ∈ Pˆ \ P . Define
U = {R ⊆ P : b ∈ Rˆ \R }.
(1) U is a nonprincipal ultrafilter over P .
(2) If the cardinality of P is less than the first measurable cardinal, then Qˆ \ Q 6= ∅ for every infinite
Q ⊆ P .
Proof. (1): The fact that U is an ultrafilter follows from the following assertions, which can be verified
immediately:
· b ∈ Pˆ , but b /∈ ∅ = ∅ˆ,
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· for all R,S ⊆ P :
– R ⊆ S if and only if Rˆ ⊆ Sˆ,
– (R ∩ S )ˆ = Rˆ ∩ Sˆ, and (R ∪ S )ˆ = Rˆ ∪ Sˆ.
To see that U is nonprincipal, notice that if U were generated by a singleton, say R = {a} with a ∈M , then
clearly Rˆ = {a} = R, while by definition of U we would have b ∈ Rˆ \R = ∅: A contradiction.
(2): Fix an infinite Q ⊆ P with card(Q) = µ and assume Qˆ = Q. We will show that this implies that U is
a µ-complete ultrafilter. By a well-known characterization of measurability, it will follow that the cardinality
of Q must be at least the first measurable cardinal.
Fix a cardinality-µ family (Rq)q∈Q of elements of U, assumed indexed by Q without loss of generality.
For each q ∈ Q, let χq be the symbol for the characteristic function of Rq; similarly, let ψ be the symbol for
the characteristic function of Q.
Let ξ be the symbol for the characteristic function of the set {(x, q) : x ∈ Rq} ⊆ M2. Then M and its
elementary extension Mˆ both satisfy the following sentences, for each q ∈ Q:
· ∀x
(
χq(x)→ ξ(x, q)
)
,
· ∀x
(
∀y
(
ψ(y)→ ξ(x, y)
)
→ χq(x)
)
;
hence, a ∈ Mˆ : a ∈ ⋂
q∈Q
Rˆq
 = {a ∈ Mˆ : Mˆ |= ∀y ξ(a, y)} .
Since Q is definable, we have
(⋂
q∈QRq
)ˆ
=
⋂
q∈Qˆ Rˆq. On the other hand, since Q = Qˆ by hypothesis and
b ∈ Rˆq for each q ∈ Q = Qˆ by definition of U, we have b ∈
⋂
q∈Q Rˆq =
(⋂
q∈QRq
)
,ˆ i.e.,
⋂
q∈QRq ∈ U. 
4.8. Theorem. Let L be a regular logic for metric structures. If L is not [ω, ω]-compact, then any complete
structure M of cardinality strictly less than the first measurable cardinal is RPC∆-characterizable in L . (If
no measurable cardinal exists, the conclusion holds for all complete metric structures.)
Proof. Assume L is not [ω, ω]-compact and let M be any complete structure of cardinality µ less than the
first measurable cardinal. Let L be the vocabulary for M.
By Proposition 4.4, let T be a satisfiable theory in a vocabulary L′ (assumed disjoint from L without loss
of generality) that contains predicate symbols P (monadic) and ⊳ (binary), and such that all models N of
T have discrete interpretations PN, ⊳N with (PN,⊳N) isomorphic to (ω,<). Fix one such model N.
Let K be the structure (on a vocabulary L˜ extending both L and L′) obtained as the full expansion of
the following structure:
· The universe K = µ ⊔M ⊔N is the disjoint union of the cardinal µ and the universes of M and N.
· The metric d of K extends dN and dM discretely (i.e., it is discrete in µ and separates by 1 the three
disjoint parts µ,M,N of K).
· If R is an n-ary predicate symbol of L (respectively L′), then the interpretation RK is equal to RM
on Mn (respectively RN on Nn) and is the constant 1 on the rest of Kn. This applies, in particular,
to the predicate symbols P and ⊳.
· If f is an n-ary function symbol of L (respectively, of L′) then fK is fM on Mn (respectively fN on
Nn) and it is 0 ∈ µ in the rest of Kn.
Since K is full, for every n < ω, L˜ has symbols interpreted as each uniformly continuous function Kn →
[0; 1]; in particular, L˜ has symbols χM , χN , χµ interpreted as the characteristic functions of M , N , µ,
respectively. Moreover, L˜ contains a symbol F interpreted as a function f : µ→M which maps µ bijectively
onto M , and maps K \M to 0 ∈ µ.
Let now K∗ be any complete L -elementary extension of K, with universe K∗, and call M∗, N∗, P ∗, ⊳∗,
µ∗, f∗, respectively, the extensions in K∗ of the discrete predicates M , N , P , ⊳, µ and the map f .
Claim 1. µ does not grow, that is, µ∗ = µ. The restriction K∗ ↾ N∗ is an L -elementary extension of
K ↾ N . Hence, by the choice of N, (P ∗,⊳∗) is isomorphic to (ω,<) and thus P ∗ is identical to P . Also
K∗ ↾ N∗ ⊔µ∗ is a L -elementary extension of K ↾ N ⊔µ and thus, in particular, a Lωω-elementary extension
with respect to the discrete full expansion of N ⊔ µ. Therefore, we have µ∗ = µ, by Lemma 4.7.
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Claim 2. M does not grow, that is, M∗ = M. Since f(µ) =M , the relativized formula
(∀x ∈M)(∃i ∈ µ)(d(f(i), x) ≤ ǫ)
holds in K for any ǫ > 0, and thus also in the Lωω-elementary extension K
∗ ⊇ K, i.e.,
K
∗ |= (∀x ∈M∗)(∃i ∈ µ∗)(d(f∗(i), x) ≤ ǫ).
However, µ∗ = µ; thus, M = f(µ) = f∗(µ) is dense in (M∗, d∗). Being complete, M is closed in M∗, hence
M∗ =M .
The last claim implies that ThL ((K, a)a∈K) gives an RPC∆-characterization of M since the relativization
by χM of any model thereof must be isomorphic to M. 
4.9. Remark. If κ is the first measurable cardinal, then the two-valued infinitary logic Lκκ is not [ω, ω]-
compact. However, since every measurable cardinal is weakly compact, Lκκ is [κ, κ]-compact; hence, the
structure (κ,<) is not RPC∆ in Lκκ.
4.10. Corollary. Let L be a regular logic for metric structures. Let κ be the smallest regular cardinal such
that L is [κ, κ]-compact (κ = ∞ if no such cardinal exists). Either κ = ω, or κ is at least as large as the
first measurable cardinal. In particular, if no measurable cardinals exist, we must have κ = ω or κ =∞.
Proof. If κ is less than the first measurable cardinal and L is not [ω, ω]-compact, then for any infinite
regular cardinal λ < κ, the structure (λ,<) is RPC∆-characterized in L by Theorem 4.8. Hence, L is not
[λ, λ]-compact, by Proposition 4.3 in contrapositive form. 
Corollary 4.10 is a generalization to the metric setting of a theorem of Makowsky and Shelah [MS83].
If L is a logic for metric structures and (D,) a fixed directed set, let us say that the Uniform Metastability
Principle (UMP) holds in L for D-nets if the equivalence asserted in part (3) of Theorem 3.14 holds.
4.11. Theorem. Let L be a regular logic for metric structures and let κ be a cardinal less than the first
measurable. If the Uniform Metastability Principle holds for κ-sequences, then it holds for ω-sequences.
Proof. Assume that κ is less than the first measurable and that the UMP for κ-sequences. If L were not
[ω, ω]-compact, then κ would be RPC∆ in L by Theorem 4.8. Proceeding as in the proof of the implication
(3)⇒ (1) of Theorem 3.14, we would find a theory ofL for a class of Cauchy κ-sequences that is not uniformly
metastable. Thus, L must be [ω, ω]-compact, so UMP in L holds for sequences, by Theorem 3.14. 
4.12. Remark. In general, the Uniform Metastability Principle does not descend from large nets to small
nets. For example, if X is an infinite set and κ is a regular cardinal such that κ > |X |, then any κ-sequence
f• = (fα : α < κ) of maps fα : X → R such that f• converges to some f : X → R pointwise must converge
uniformly, and thus (Fα : α < κ) is uniformly metastable. (To see this, given ǫ > 0, for each x ∈ X
choose βx < κ such that |fα(x) − f(x)| ≤ ǫ for every α > βx; by regularity, β := supx∈X βx < κ, and thus
|fα(x) − f(x)| ≤ ǫ for every α > β and every x ∈ X .) On the other hand, it is easy to exhibit a pointwise
converging sequence f• = (fn)n<ω that is not uniformly metastable, e.g., by adapting the construction of
family D in Remarks 3.6: If (xi)i<ω is a countable collection of distinct points of X , let fn(x) = 1 if both
(i) n is odd, and (ii) x = xi for some i > n, and let fn(x) = 0 otherwise. Then fn → 0 pointwise, but
{f•(x) : x ∈ X} is not uniformly metastable.
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